

**On-Line Appendix for**  
***The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans***  
**University of Chicago Press, 2009**  
Last Updated: June 23, 2009

This supplemental appendix gives a series of analyses referenced in *The Partisan Sort* which were cut for space reasons.

## **Alternate Measures of Issue Clarity**

Figure 1 gives three alternative measures of issue position clarity: the measure of clarity developed in Carmines and Stimson (1986), the percentage who see “important differences” between the parties, and the percentage who can correctly place the Democrats to the left of the liberal-conservative scale midpoint, and Republicans to the right (e.g., those who understand that Democrats are liberals and Republicans are conservatives).

[Figure 1 about here.]

Note that all three measures show a general increase over time, consistent with the argument given in the main section of the text.

## **Party Clarity vs. NOMINATE**

As a validity check, I can verify that changes in party clarity actually correspond to increases in the distance between the parties using Poole and Rosenthal’s 1997 DW-NOMINATE measure. Figure 2 plots the relationship between the percentage of the public who see important differences between the parties and the distance between the parties, as measured via NOMINATE.<sup>1</sup>

[Figure 2 about here.]

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<sup>1</sup>The measure of party distance is the distance between the party medians in the U.S. House on the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE.

As figure 2 reveals, there is a strong relationship between the measure of perceived issue clarity (the percentage of the public who see important differences between the parties) and the “actual” measure of party positions (DW-NOMINATE). The two series are correlated at 0.89, suggesting a strong and sensible relationship: as the parties move farther apart in Congress, a larger proportion of the mass public understands the parties take divergent positions. This should help reassure readers that changes in perceptions of issue position clarity are in fact grounded in real-world policy changes.

## **Sorting with Only White Respondents**

Figure 3 replicates the analysis in figure 3.2 of the book using only white respondents. Note that no substantive conclusions change when using only white respondents.

[Figure 3 about here.]

## **Over-time Regressions, Other Issues**

Figures 4 through 7 replicate figure 4.1 from the book, here using issue positions as the dependent variable. The four dependent variables where the NES has asked the necessary items over time are: the aid to minorities scale, the guaranteed jobs scale, the government services and spending scale, and the defense spending scale. These are constructed in the same way as the regressions reported in the book, except that (1) they use issue-specific measures of knowledge of elite polarization, and (2) they drop the coefficient for race, though respondents of all races are included in the analysis (except for the analysis of the aid to minorities scale, where only white respondents are included). Note that in all cases, knowledge of elite polarization has a large and statistically significant effect on voter sorting on each issue.

[Figure 4 about here.]

[Figure 5 about here.]

[Figure 6 about here.]

[Figure 7 about here.]

## **Pooled Model, with NOMINATE**

Table 1 gives the results of a pooled cross-sectional model predicting sorting, using NOMINATE as the measure of elite polarization (as before, the actual measure is the distance between the party medians on the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE). Note that this NOMINATE-based measure is also a statistically significant predictor of sorting.

[Table 1 about here.]

## **Age, Period, Cohort Model**

Table 2 reports the results of an age, period, cohort model. Here, age and cohort are as defined by the NES, and “period” corresponds to the Presidential administrations. Cohort effects and period effects are measured relative to the 1927-1942 birth cohort and the Nixon administration, respectively.

[Table 2 about here.]

## **Sorting in the 1972-1974-1976 Panel**

Table 3 replicates table 4.2 in the text using the 1972-1974-1976 panel data. The main difference is that there are not enough information items to form a reliable political information measure, so I substitute education as a proxy. Note that the main finding—that recognition of elite party differences predicts sorting—replicates in that analysis as well.

[Table 3 about here.]

## **Sorting in the 2000-2002-2004 Panel**

Table 4 replicates table 4.2, this time in the 2000-2002-2004 panel data. Given the lack of ideological self-identification measure in the 2004 wave, I look simply at the 2000-2002 change. Again, the main finding replicates (e.g., recognition of elite party differences has a significant effect on sorting).

[Table 4 about here.]

## **Panel Model, Controlling for Education**

Table 5 re-estimates table 4.2 from the book using the 1992-1994-1996 panel data, but also controls for the respondent's level of education. Note that even controlling for education, recognition of elite party differences has a significant effect on sorting.

[Table 5 about here.]

## **Experimental Prompts**

Chapter 5 discusses, in some detail, a series of original experiments I conducted to test the elite polarization/sorting link. An example of the experimental stimulus seen by experiment participants is given below in figure 8.

[Figure 8 about here.]

## **Party-Driven vs. Ideology-Driven Change, 1994-1996**

Table 6.1 in the book looks at party-driven vs. ideology-driven sorting in the 1992-1994 wave of the panel data. In the 1994-1996 wave, consider the liberal-conservative self-identification scale. There, of those who sort between 1994 and 1996, 75% do so by changing their ideological

self-identification, 9% do so by changing their partisanship, and the remaining 16% do so by changing both. This reinforces the finding in the book: most sorting is driven by adjusting ideological self-identification or issue positions to fit with partisanship.

## **Sophistication and Party-Driven Sorting**

Table 6 replicates table 6.2 in the manuscript, except substitutes a direct political sophistication measure for education. Table 6 gives the 1992-1994 results. Note that there is *less* party-driven sorting in the high sophistication group, *contra* the expectation. Regardless, the difference in the amount of party-driven sorting is not statistically significant ( $\chi^2 = 1.9, p = 0.17$ ).

[Table 6 about here.]

## **Sorting in the White South, 1992-1994**

Table 7 replicates table 6.3 on sorting in the white South, but for the 1992-1994 data. There is no statistically significant difference in ideologically-driven sorting (sorting by changing your partisanship) between the white South and the remainder of the nation ( $\chi^2 = 0.08, p = 0.78$ ).

[Table 7 about here.]

## **Cross-Pressured Partisans**

The patterns presented above suggest that when an individual moves from not sorted to sorted that ideological self-identification is generally the factor more likely to move. Do the same patterns hold for issue positions more broadly? To examine whether or not this is the case, I look at cross-pressured partisans: partisans whose ideological self-identification or issue positions are out of step with their national party elites (for example, a pro-choice Republican). Traditional theories of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) would suggest that respondents should adjust one factor or the other

to lessen the discord between the two factors. Subsequent research, however, has arrived at different conclusions about whether or not subjects act to reduce cognitive dissonance, with some arguing that subjects *do* act to reduce dissonance (Harmon-Jones and Mills 1999; Aronson 1992), and others arguing that dissonance need not produce a change in attitudes (Billig 1996; Neuman and Tabak 2003; Kunda 1992). This suggests that there are two interesting aspects to the analysis of these cross-pressured partisans. First, there is the question of whether or not respondents will adjust their discordant beliefs. Second, if respondents adjust their beliefs, will they do so by adjusting their party ID or their issue positions? In light of the conflicting findings, I expect to find mixed results for the first question: that is, some respondents should resolve the conflict, while others should allow it to remain. For the second question, given the existing results, I expect the change to be driven by partisanship.

In order to proceed, I lay out the following list of ways a cross-pressured respondent change between two waves of panel data. Specifically, a respondent could:

1. Hold party ID constant and move the issue position toward party ID (a pro-choice Republican becomes more pro-life)
2. Hold the issue position constant and move party ID toward the issue position (a pro-choice Republican becomes more Democratic)
3. Change neither party ID nor the issue position (no change)
4. Move both party ID and the issue position towards party ID (a pro-choice Republican becomes *both* more pro-life and more Republican)
5. Move both party ID and the issue position towards the issue position (a pro-choice Republican becomes *both* more pro-choice and more Democratic)
6. *Increase* the dissonance between party ID and the issue position (a pro-choice Republican does not change his opinion on abortion, but becomes more Republican)<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Technically, there are four possibilities in this final category: respondents can (1) hold their party ID constant

Note that respondents have three options here to resolve the conflict between their dissonant issue positions and partisanship. They can resolve the conflict (routes one, two, four and five), they can allow the conflict to persist (route three) or they can increase the conflict (route six). Knowing which route citizens take will allow me to answer both questions posed earlier: whether or not citizens resolve conflicts between party and issue positions, and if they do, whether they do so in favor of party or issue positions.

In my analysis below, I focus on the cases with the clearest temporal ordering : scenarios one, two, and three. In these instances, respondents change their attitudes in a way that permits me to identify the cause and the effect. In the first case, party ID is constant but the issue position changes. Here, I can reasonably conclude party ID is the driving force behind the change. In the second scenario, respondents move their issue position into alignment with their party ID, so it stands to reason that the issue position is the causal variable. Case three also allows for a reasonably clear deduction that *neither* variable appears to be particularly dominant.

In cases four and five, I can make inferences about the relative influence of the two variables, but they will be somewhat less precise. Here, respondents are changing both party ID and ideology at the same time, so the inference may be less clean than one would ideally like. However, that said, it seems reasonable to assume that when a respondent moves both his party ID and issue positions towards his party ID, that his partisanship is driving the change.

Which path will citizens pursue? Given the strength of the patterns observed in table 6.1, I hypothesize that if citizens move to resolve the conflicts between their partisanship and issue positions, the most common pattern will be for issue positions to change to accommodate partisanship. Table 8 gives the patterns observed among cross-pressured partisans in the 1992-1994 wave of the panel data.<sup>3</sup>

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and move their issue position away from their party ID (a pro-choice Republican becomes more strongly pro-choice), (2) hold their issue position constant and move their party ID away from their issue position (the example given above), (3-4) move your party ID and issue positions in opposite directions (a pro-choice Republican becomes more Democratic but more pro-life, or she becomes more Republican but more pro-choice).

<sup>3</sup>A cross-pressured partisan is a respondent who takes a position that is out of step with his national party elites. Operationally, this means that a Democrat takes a position more conservative than the midpoint (and vice-versa for a Republican). For example, a cross-pressured Democrat on the issue of government services and spending favors less government spending (i.e., a five, six, or seven on that scale). For the four-point scales (abortion and gay job

[Table 8 about here.]

To interpret table 8, begin with the data for scenarios one through three. Note that for each issue, of these three outcomes, the most common outcome is for respondents to move their issue position into alignment with their party ID.<sup>4</sup> For example, on the issue of the government services and spending trade-off, thirty-five percent of cross-pressured partisans move their issue position closer into alignment with their party ID (so, for example, a Republican who favored more spending in 1992 now favors less spending in 1994). Save for the issue of abortion (to which I return below), respondents consistently are more likely to adjust their issue position into alignment with their party ID. The respondents may not fully resolve the conflict between their party and their attitudes, but they at least move to lessen the conflict. It's as if party "pulls them home," moving their position on any given issue toward the stance of the party elites, replicating the pattern seen earlier in table 6.1. This suggests that party ID, more than issue positions or liberal-conservative self-identification, is at the center of respondent's political worldview.

Examining the remainder of table 8, note that a non-trivial number of cross-pressured respondents lessen the conflict between their party ID and issue position by moving both their party ID and issue position toward their party ID (route 4). Interestingly, almost no respondents selected the opposite path (route 5): to move their issue position and party ID toward their issue position (that is, a pro-choice Republican becoming both more pro-choice and more Democratic). Although this provides us with a weaker inference than in the discussion of scenarios one or two above, it does reinforce my earlier conclusion: party ID is typically the dominant factor shaping Americans' political behavior.

Finally, the respondents in scenario six—those who make a dissonant change—also deserve some comment. Interestingly, for every issue, at least fifteen percent of the population *increases* the conflict between their party ID and their issue position. This seems to suggest that a sizable number of respondents are either unaware or unaffected by the cognitive discomfort resulting

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(discrimination), Democrats are cross-pressured if they take one of the two more conservative options, and vice-versa for Republicans.

<sup>4</sup>Table 8 reports results pooling across parties. Reporting the results by party would yield very substantively similar results.



from discordant partisanship and issue positions (Hillygus and Shields 2005). Consistent with the critiques of dissonance theory cited earlier, many respondents appear to be perfectly willing to allow conflicts to remain.<sup>5</sup>

There is one major exception in table 8 to the above conclusion: the issue of legal abortion. For this issue, the modal response for a cross-pressured partisan is no change of either variable. Many respondents are perfectly happy to take abortion positions at odds with their party's elites, even on this most controversial issue (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005). What makes this issue different? While I cannot give a definitive answer, I suspect it has to do with the prominence of abortion in contemporary American politics. Abortion is so constantly debated, almost *ad nauseam*, in contemporary discourse that nearly everyone knows where they stand. For example, less than one percent of respondents in 1992 give a "don't know" response to the abortion item. In contrast, ten percent don't know where they stand on the defense spending scale, and fifteen percent don't know where they stand on the government services/spending scale. Abortion is also the sort of personally-relevant, emotional, easy to understand issue on which respondents often have stable attitudes that are resistant to change (Carmines and Stimson 1980). Both of these factors undoubtedly influence why abortion attitudes appear to be different.

Looking at the other panel studies, we see only one other issue<sup>6</sup> that looks like the issue of legal abortion: Democrats on the issue of school busing in the 1972-1974-1976 panel.<sup>7</sup> While the Democratic elite supported school busing in the name of racial equality—the 1972 Democratic Platform supported school busing as one of several means to achieve integrated schools—ordinary citizens overwhelmingly opposed the program: fully seventy-five percent of all respondents and seventy-one percent of Democratic respondents to the 1972 wave of the 1972-74-76 panel study

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<sup>5</sup>Of course, it is also possible that these respondents do not realize there is a conflict at all. I attempted to subset the data by examining those who understand where elites stood on the issue, hypothesizing that those who understood where elites positioned themselves would be aware of the conflict between their party ID and their issue positions. Splitting the data this way results in too few cases for analysis.

<sup>6</sup>A similar pattern to the results reported here is also seen on the issue of defense spending for Democrats in 1980: Democrats are much more likely to support increased defense spending over time. At that point, however, even most Democratic elites were likely to support additional defense spending (Zaller 1992, 14-15). Given this, one can make a reasonable case that this issue fits the patterns observed above.

<sup>7</sup>Given the overwhelming opposition in the general public to busing, there were almost no Republicans out of step with their party on this issue.

gave the most conservative answer (“keep children in neighborhood schools”) to the school busing item. Further, Democrats opposed to school busing show a strong resistance to the party’s pro-busing message: for this issue, the plurality of respondents remain out of step with their party. Several points are worth noting about the issue. First, much like abortion, this is an emotional, highly personally relevant “easy” issue likely to inspire stable attitudes. For example, Converse and Markus (1979) find that attitudes toward school busing are among the most stable attitudes in the 1972-1976 panel. Further, though the Democratic Party overall supported busing, the party was far from unified on this point. A sizable contingent of notable party figures, particularly in the South, opposed the integration effort. So here, the signal partisans received from their party elites was quite heterogeneous, making it easier to rectify a Democratic identification with opposition to school busing.<sup>8</sup> Given the emotional cast to the issue and the elite heterogeneity, the resistance of Democratic identifiers to the party’s support of school busing should not be surprising.

These two issues—legal abortion in the 1990s and school busing in the 1970s—demonstrate the limits of partisan cues. Much of the power of party ID to mold and shape other political attitudes stems from the powerful partisan-based elite cues citizens receive. Under normal circumstances, most citizens succumb to those cues. But the cues are not all-powerful and when citizens have firm opinions—particularly on emotional, highly relevant issues—party cues appear to have little effect. Party cues are powerful, but they are not omnipotent.

Looking at the other NES panel studies, the results parallel the patterns reported in table 8. Time and again, the results demonstrate the power of party ID to influence political beliefs. This pattern is even more striking in part due to the differing levels of elite polarization. In the 1970s, members of Congress from both parties were ideologically heterogeneous: there were a number of conservative Southern Democrats and liberal Republicans. So if a Republican took a liberal stand on, say, government spending, he could find elite Republicans who felt the same way. Given this state of affairs, he may have felt little incentive to change his view: after all, a number of elite Republicans shared his view. By the 1990s, a Republican identifier would be hard pressed to find

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<sup>8</sup>Looking at racial issues in the 1970s among white Southerners reveals a very similar pattern: these respondents appear to be willing to maintain a Democratic identification alongside fairly conservative positions on racial issues.

a similar elite Republican pronouncing the need for more government spending on social welfare programs, so he should feel more pressure to change his position. Yet remarkably, despite these differences, the same basic pattern holds across these periods. While there are differences in level across the years, the basic pattern remains the same, a testament to the power of party ID to mold attitudes and opinions.

## **Affective Sorting, Likes & Dislikes**

This section replicates table 7.2 on affective sorting, using the party likes and dislikes measure. I look at “net affect” for both your party and the opposite party, where net affect is the number of likes you have for a party less the number of dislikes you have (Hetherington 2001). Positive values of net affect imply that you have more likes than dislikes for a given party, and negative values imply the opposite. Table 9 gives the results. Note that the main findings replicate: after sorting, voters like their own party more, and the other party less.

[Table 9 about here.]

## **Placebo Tests, Effects of Sorting**

Table 10 gives the results of a series of placebo tests discussed in chapter 7. In particular, it reports the change in behavior among the “never sorted.” The idea is simple. Chapter 7 argues that sorting changes behavior, so behavior should look different pre- and post-sorting. But if you never sort, then your behavior should not change. Table 10 gives the results of this placebo test estimated on those who are unsorted at all 3 waves (e.g., unsorted in 1992, 1994, and 1996). Note that consistent with my expectations, there is no systematic difference in 1992 and 1996 behavior for respondents who are never sorted. You can also verify the main effects reported in the paper looking at the 1972-74-76 panel and the 2000-02-04 panel.

[Table 10 about here.]

## References

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### Perceptions of Party Position Clarity




Figure 1: Alternate measures of issue position clarity.

### Seeing Important Differences Responds to Party Polarization




Figure 2: Relationship between issue position clarity (perceived) and party divergence, measured via DW-NOMINATE.




Figure 3: Replication of figure 3.2, using only white respondents.






Figure 4: Graph of logistic regression coefficients predicting sorting on the aid to minorities scale (white respondents only). For more details on this analysis, see the discussion of figure 4.1 in the book.




Figure 5: Graph of logistic regression coefficients predicting sorting on the guaranteed jobs scale. For more details on this analysis, see the discussion of figure 4.1 in the book.




Figure 6: Graph of logistic regression coefficients predicting sorting on the government services and spending scale. For more details on this analysis, see the discussion of figure 4.1 in the book.





Figure 7: Graph of logistic regression coefficients predicting sorting on the defense spending scale. For more details on this analysis, see the discussion of figure 4.1 in the book.

The federal government currently has the primary responsibility for developing and carrying out many types of job-training programs. Some people have argued that the federal government should instead allow state governments to have primary control over these job-training programs.


We asked Members of Congress whether they agreed or disagreed with giving state governments primary control over job-training programs. Here's how they responded.



Next

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Next

Figure 8: Graphics seen by respondents depicting the polarized elites condition (top panel) and the moderate elites condition (bottom panel). Lighter figures depict Democrats, darker figures depict Republicans. Note that actual respondents were shown the figures in color (see the on-line appendix for the figures as respondents saw them).

Variable	Estimate
Intercept	<b>-3.58</b> (0.26)
South	<b>-0.27</b> (0.03)
Democrat	<b>-0.42</b> (0.03)
Lowest Third, Income	-0.07 (0.05)
Highest Third, Income	<b>0.34</b> (0.03)
General Political Information	<b>0.67</b> (0.02)
Elite Polarization (NOMINATE)	<b>1.71</b> (0.31)
Born 1895-1910	-0.17 (0.11)
Born 1911-1926	-0.18 (0.11)
Born 1927-1942	<b>-0.44</b> (0.12)
Born 1943-1958	<b>-0.54</b> (0.11)
Born 1959-1974	<b>-0.43</b> (0.12)
Born after 1975	-0.36 (0.23)
Year Fixed Effects (Jointly Significant)	
N	25,795

Table 1: Pooled cross-sectional regression predicting sorting, using NOMINATE as the measure of elite polarization. Reporting conventions follow those employed in the book.

Variable	Estimate
Intercept	<b>-1.2</b> (0.11)
Age	<b>0.07</b> (0.03)
Nixon Administration	– –
Ford Administration	0.09 (0.07)
Carter Administration	0.04 (0.06)
Reagan Administration	0.04 (0.06)
Bush 41 Administration	0.00 (0.07)
Clinton Administration	<b>0.30</b> (0.07)
Bush 43 Administration	<b>0.48</b> (0.09)
Born before 1895	0.10 (0.09)
Born 1895-1910	<b>0.14</b> (0.08)
Born 1911-1926	<b>0.28</b> (0.05)
Born 1927-1942	– –
Born 1943-1958	<b>-0.34</b> (0.06)
Born 1959-1974	<b>-0.53</b> (0.10)
Born after 1975	<b>-0.66</b> (0.20)
N	30,280

Table 2: Age-period-cohort model of sorting. Reporting conventions follow those employed in the book. Age has been divided by 10 to aid in coefficient interpretation.

Variable	Estimate
Intercept	<b>-2.72</b> (0.31)
Sorted, Previous Period	<b>1.44</b> (0.10)
Recognize Elite Party Differences	<b>0.71</b> (0.14)
Education	<b>0.17</b> (0.03)
Democrat	<b>-0.27</b> (0.11)
Male	<b>0.27</b> (0.10)
Born 1910 or earlier	0.20 (0.18)
Born 1911-1923	0.08 (0.16)
Born 1924 - 1935	-0.06 (0.15)
Born 1936 - 1945	-0.003 (0.15)
Caucasian	-0.22 (0.19)
Southerner	-0.21 (0.18)
Lowest Third, Income	-0.15 (0.15)
Highest Third, Income	0.10 (0.12)
Southerner $\times$ Democrat	-0.17 (0.26)
N	2272

Table 3: Model predicting sorting in the 1972-1974-1976 panel data. Reporting conventions follow those employed in the book.



Variable	Estimate
Intercept	-0.81 (0.72)
Sorted, Previous Period	<b>1.91</b> (0.26)
Recognize Elite Party Differences	<b>1.61</b> (0.42)
General Political Knowledge	<b>0.51</b> (0.17)
Democrat	<b>-0.81</b> (0.30)
Southerner	-0.57 (0.36)
Male	-0.41 (0.26)
Born before 1926	-0.52 (0.75)
Born 1926 - 1943	-0.99 (0.61)
Born 1944 - 1959	<b>-1.09</b> (0.59)
Born 1960 - 1975	-0.44 (0.58)
Lowest Third, Income	-0.54 (0.35)
Highest Third, Income	-0.41 (0.28)
Democrat $\times$ Southerner	<b>1.01</b> (0.58)
N	409

Table 4: Model predicting sorting in the 2000-2002-2004 panel data. Reporting conventions follow those employed in the book.

Variable	Estimate
Intercept	<b>-2.39</b> (0.34)
Sorted, Previous Period	<b>2.02</b> (0.13)
Recognize Elite Party Differences	<b>0.87</b> (0.16)
General Political Knowledge	<b>0.28</b> (0.16)
Democrat	0.03 (0.15)
Southerner	0.18 (0.18)
Male	-0.10 (0.13)
Pre-New Deal Cohort	-0.34 (0.35)
New Deal Cohort	<b>-0.46</b> (0.22)
Post-New Deal Cohort	-0.31 (0.19)
Baby Boomer Cohort	-0.24 (0.16)
Caucasian	<b>0.49</b> (0.19)
Lowest Third, Income	<b>-0.30</b> (0.16)
Highest Third, Income	0.02 (0.15)
Education	<b>0.13</b> (0.05)
Democrat $\times$ Southerner	-0.28 (0.27)
N	1764

Table 5: Model predicting sorting in the 1992-1994-1996 panel data, controlling for education. Reporting conventions follow those employed in the book.

<b>High Sophistication (1992-1994):</b>			
Ideologically-Driven:			
		No	Yes
Party-Driven	No	-	64
	Yes	16	20
<b>Low Sophistication (1992-1994):</b>			
Ideologically-Driven:			
		No	Yes
Party-Driven	No	-	48
	Yes	34	17

Table 6: Replication of table 6.2, substituting a direct sophistication measure for education.

<b>While South (1992-1994):</b>			
Ideologically-Driven:			
		No	Yes
Party-Driven	No	-	45
	Yes	36	18
<b>Other Voters (1992-1994):</b>			
Ideologically-Driven:			
		No	Yes
Party-Driven	No	-	52
	Yes	30	18

Table 7: Replication of table 6.3 using the 1992-1994 panel data.

Issue	(1) Issue → PID	(2) PID → Issue	(3) Constant	(4) Move Both Toward Party ID	(5) Move Both Toward Issue Position	(6) Dissonant
Government Services and Spending	35	14	5	18	0	29
Abortion	14	22	30	11	2	21
Defense Spending	30	9	15	16	3	26
Guaranteed Jobs	31	10	10	21	1	26
Gay Job Discrimination (92-96)	23	18	15	12	5	26
Aid to Minorities	27	12	20	17	2	22
Ideological Self-Identification	33	16	14	18	4	18

Table 8: Percentage of cross-pressured partisans who move to rectify the conflict between their issue attitude and party ID between 1992 and 1994. Entries are row percentages pooling across parties. The numbering of the columns corresponds to the order in the list above. Note that some rows do not sum to 100 due to rounding.

Activity	1992 Rating	1996 Rating	t Statistic	p-Value
<b>Evaluations of the Parties:</b>				
Same-Party Net Affect	0.66	1.02	1.54	0.07
Other-Party Net Affect	-0.5	-1.12	1.92	0.03

Table 9: Effect of sorting on net affect for the parties. *p*-values are one-tailed.

Activity	1992 Behavior	1996 Behavior	Difference	Test Statistic	p-Value
<b>Voting:</b>					
Voting for the Same Party Nominee	74	65	-9	1.75	0.19
Split-Ticket Voting	32	23	-9	1.5	0.21
<b>Affect:</b>					
Difference between the Parties	23.3	23.8	0.05	-0.29	0.77
Difference between the Presidential Nominees	25	24.5	-0.5	0.23	0.82
Difference between the Vice-Presidential Nominees	20.8	15.2	-5.6	0.29	0.77
<b>Attitudes:</b>					
Abortion	39	36	-3	0.19	0.66
Government Services and Spending	25	34	9	2.6	0.11
Aid to Minorities	27	26	-1	0	1
Guaranteed Jobs	38	33	-5	0.8	0.37
Defense Spending	35	27	-8	1.95	0.16
Affirmative Action	36	37	1	0.005	0.94
Health Insurance	41	40	-1	0.02	0.89
Gay Job Discrimination	41	48	7	1.3	0.25

Table 10: Placebo test, replicating tables 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 for respondents who are unsorted in all three waves.