

Appendix, Chapter 3




Figure 1: This figure illustrates each election in the gubernatorial data set by state and year. Each dash indicates a year in which the state in question held an election recorded in our data set.

Persistence in Presidential and Gubernatorial Voting

Our analyses of persistence consider presidential voting in all elections between Franklin Roosevelt's first election in 1932 and Barack Obama's re-election in 2012. The reason for starting in 1932 is simple: Chhibber and Kollman (2004) argue that the New Deal shifted the balance of authority from the states to the federal government, and so encouraged parties to focus on capturing federal power, namely Congress and the Presidency. In that view, the growth of federal authority and spending during the New Deal made the federal government a more important electoral prize. By including elections just before that transformation, we are able to observe the nationalization that they attribute to the growth of federal authority, and can compare it to any changes we observe in later periods.

By estimating a separate linear regression for each year, we can predict the two-party Democratic vote share using the prior election's vote share as well as fixed effects which capture any state-specific idiosyncrasies such as home-state advantages or targeted campaigning. A coefficient of zero indicates that knowing the prior election result tells us nothing about the current election result; a coefficient of one indicates a one-to-one correspondence between the prior election and this one.¹ To prevent smaller counties from unduly influencing the estimates, we weight the regression using the total number of presidential votes in each county.

¹Coefficients can be above one in cases where the electorate grows more geographically polarized between elections. For example, a county that supported the Democrats at 30% initially might fall to 28%, while one that supported the Democrats at 70% might grow to 72%.




Figure 2: Electoral Persistence, Presidential Voting. This figure plots the coefficients from separate models predicting the two-party share of the Democratic presidential vote in each election using the prior two-party vote share. The dots indicate mean estimates, while the vertical lines illustrate 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 3: Electoral Persistence, Gubernatorial Voting. For gubernatorial elections in midterm years, this figure plots the coefficients from separate models predicting the two-party share of the Democratic gubernatorial vote in each election using the two-party gubernatorial vote share from four years prior. The dots indicate mean estimates, while the vertical lines illustrate 95% confidence intervals.