"Zerilli offers a tightly argued, provocative study of judgment in a democratic, pluralistic society. She surveys some of the prominent thinkers in Western theory of the 20th century, such as Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls. In tackling her subject, Zerilli examines various schools of thought and finds most have something to contribute but fall short of the goals she has set for them. In her examination of Leo Strauss, for example, she provides readers with trenchant observations that Straussian scholars have often overlooked, and she grasps some essential arguments of Strauss that help her clarify her own position. But Hannah Arendt is whom the author finds most helpful in developing the argument that democrats must acknowledge plurality and action. The book will stimulate an important debate among theorists of democracy and modern political thought. Highly recommended."

Choice

“What is democratic political judgment? Does it require a standpoint of neutrality about normative truths? In this monumental work, Zerilli, combining both continental and analytic traditions in philosophy, gives a powerful case for the role of truth and objectivity in democratic political judgment, one attuned to the irreducible plurality of democratic societies. It is a vital contribution to what is arguably the central question of democratic political philosophy: What is democratic reasoning?”

Jason Stanley, Yale University

“Zerilli has presented an original and meticulous scholarly argument about the nature and possibilities of democratic judgment as well as about what might be construed as authentically political judgment in the context of a plural society. Her argument is lucidly and eloquently articulated, and it offers a pointed challenge to some of the dominant contemporary trends in the literature on democratic theory, particularly to the arguments about public reason that have been advanced by individuals such as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Drawing creatively on the work of Kant and Arendt, Zerilli speaks to anyone concerned with the peculiarities of democratic deliberation and action, whether it takes place in formal institutional settings or in other dimensions of social life.”

John G. Gunnell, State University of New York at Albany

“An elegant, beautifully written, and intelligent attempt to answer the fundamental question of fair evaluative judgments in a democratic polity. Zerilli argues that judgment that aims at fairness in a pluralist society does not need to be rendered as a merely procedural guide for adjudication among irreconcilable values. And she also argues that to make judgment a politically creative and reflecting function of evaluation does not necessarily entail falling into the trap of relativism or the identification of rationality with the reasons set forth by the winners in the game of politics. To solve these entrenched problems, Zerilli takes inspiration from Hannah Arendt, whose work guides her through a journey of interpretation and theoretical analysis that is absolutely brilliant.”

Nadia Urbinati, Columbia University